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Anything Goes? Science and Social
Constructions in Competing Discourses
PHILIP DYBICZ
Keimyung University
South Korea
This paper examines, then disproves, the claim that social work
practices based upon postmodern thought are either anti-science,
or at the very least, weak on their respect for and application of
scientific knowledge. Postmodern thought does attack the epis-
temological theory of positivism as well as the correspondence
theory of truth. Hence, postmodern social work practices do seek
to displace the role that scientific knowledge plays in guiding the
helping situation. Rather than diagnosing causes and effects in
a problem-solving endeavor, science is used to circumscribe the
boundaries within which a postmodern endeavor at conscious-
ness-raising takes place. Describing this new role for scientific
knowledge within postmodern practice is the object of this study.
Key words: postmodern, anti-science, positivism, social work
practice, scientific knowledge
With the appearance in recent years of postmodern social
work practices-such as the strengths perspective, narrative
therapy, and solution-focused therapy-some confusion has
arisen over what role exactly science plays in the successful
application of these approaches. Some opponents (Amundson,
2001; Pilgrim, 2000; Thyer, 2008; Thyer & Myers, 1999) have
criticized them as being weak on embracing scientific evidence
or ignoring it completely, thus putting clients in jeopardy.
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Supporters (De Shazer, 1994; Weick & Saleebey, 1998; White,
2004) have been quick to counter that they do not ignore sci-
entific evidence, yet they recognize it as a truth with a small
"t"-which to the other side, appears to confirm their claim
about being weak on science.
The relativism inherent within a postmodern approach
to practice appears to critics to promote an "anything goes"
attitude in which scientific knowledge can be conveniently
ignored-at the peril of the client. This critique is valid-but
only if an overly naive understanding of postmodern insights
is applied. While scientific knowledge does not take center
stage, it does have an important role to play in guiding post-
modern practice. The major goal of this paper is to outline this
role.
A good analogy can be drawn by making a historical com-
parison to the time period when the modern, scientific approach
to practice began to replace its predecessor-social work prac-
tices of the 1800s and early 1900s that were based upon moral
knowledge. Some practitioners of this time period (Lubove,
1965) warned that the value-free stance of the new scientific ap-
proach would necessarily lead to an "anything goes" attitude
wherein moral knowledge could be conveniently ignored-at
the peril of the client. And indeed, within both the natural and
social sciences, there were some examples where this came to
pass, the Tuskegee syphilis experiment (Jones, 1981) being one
such prominent example.
While Tuskegee and other such incidents did occur, they
represented an overly naive application of the scientific method
that lead to morally reprehensible acts. They do not represent
the model or ideal of how a modernist approach to research
and practice should be employed. The model for modernist
research and practice embraces moral knowledge-not as an
investigative tool to uncover mechanisms of causality-but
rather, as a guide to social work practice and research that cir-
cumscribes the boundaries within which a scientific investiga-
tion can take place. Hence, internal review boards have been set
up at universities to demarcate appropriate limits on research
conducted upon human subjects. The social work profession
has developed a robust code of ethics as a means by which to
set the conditions for a scientific approach to practice.
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What this paper will demonstrate is that postmodern prac-
tice seeks a similar goal when embracing scientific knowledge.
Postmodern approaches do not seek to employ scientific knowl-
edge as an investigative tool with which to uncover mecha-
nisms of causality in which to promote change, but rather, as
a guide to practice that circumscribes the boundaries within
which a postmodem inquiry can take place. To clearly define
this role for scientific knowledge, this article will describe how
the helping situation is defined by both the postmodern and
modem discourse. But first, a brief digression in defining the
term 'discourse' will be useful.
Discourse
The term "discourse" here is used as offered by Foucault
(1991, 1994a, 1994b). Briefly, a discourse is an epistemological
framework in which the very ordering of knowledges lends
significance and value to how these knowledges are expressed
and practiced. As Foucault (1994a) notes, "The facts of dis-
course would then have to be treated not as autonomous nuclei
of multiple significations, but as events and functional seg-
ments gradually coming together to form a system" (p. xvii).
To better understand this premise, we can turn to the work of
the Swiss linguist Saussure from whom Foucault drew some of
his insights. Note the similarity to Saussure's (1966/1906-1911)
observations on language: "Language is a system of interde-
pendent terms in which the value of each term results solely
from the simultaneous presence of the others" (p. 114).
Saussure uses the metaphor of a chess game to illustrate
this point. While certain qualities of a chess piece never change
during the game (e.g., how it moves, how it captures other
pieces), the value and significance of a given piece is deter-
mined by its position on the board and its relationship to all
the other pieces. Saussure's (1966/1906-1911) structuralist ap-
proach applies this principle to a conception of language in the
abstract. Foucault (1991, 1994a, 1994b) adopts a poststructural-
ist stance by applying this principle to the practices of knowl-
edge. To fully appreciate the implications of Foucault's move,
we must go beyond the simple metaphor of a chess game.
For example, game pieces are not moved by an
103
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
individual person, but rather the interplay of multitudinous
voices in society-the dominant plurality in this cacophony
wins out in affecting such movement. Yet one will always be
able to find dissenting voices-what Foucault (1981, 1991)
terms as subjugated knowledges. More importantly to our
purpose here, the arrangement or ordering of knowledges not
only affects the significance and value granted to them (e.g.,
how positivism is both expressed and thrust forward as a major
knowledge in the modern discourse), but this ordering also
affects the grid/playing board upon which they are arranged
and the very rules of the game itself. Hence, Foucault (1994a)
talks about "space opening up" and how a discourse creates
"rules of formation" (1994b) or "rules of right" (1991). Taking
a cue from Wittgenstein (1968, 1970), Foucault (1994b) then
speaks to how this system of ordering creates the conditions
within which practices of knowledge become intelligible.
When applied to the history of social welfare in America, the
above dynamic is illustrated in the following manner. During
the Discourse of the 1800s and early 1900s, moral knowledge
held the greatest prominence. This made the 'game' of social
work interventions that of an endeavor at moral uplift (Leiby,
1978; Trattner, 1999), whether the site of this intervention hap-
pened to be the individual (e.g., Scientific Charity) or structures
in society (e.g., the settlement house movement). When the
modern, scientific Discourse replaced the above, the "game"
of social work interventions also changed even though various
objectives (e.g., alleviating poverty and hardship) remained
the same. Within the modern Discourse, the game of social
work interventions is that of an endeavor at scientific problem-
solving (Leighninger, 1987; Perlman, 1963). Within the post-
modern discourse (still small "d," as it has yet to achieve a
period of dominance), the game changes once again. As will be
presently elaborated upon, social work interventions become
an endeavor at consciousness-raising.
This level of understanding concerning the term "dis-
course"-as is represented in Foucault's early works-suits this
paper's purpose of explaining the role of science in postmod-
ern practice. What follows will be a description of prominent
intellectual thought concerning ontology (i.e. reality), episte-
mology, and causality for each the modern and postmodern
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discourses. This thought does not represent the discourse as
such, but rather, their positions of prominence reflect its order-
ing. A discourse contains not only practices of knowledge in
terms of theory, but also practices of cultural knowledges. In
addition, Foucault (1981, 1991) later added notions of power:
prominent knowledges (e.g., positivism) serve to spawn prac-
tices of knowledge (e.g., DSM I-IV) that serve to reinforce
their dominance, as well as concrete elements and practices in
society (e.g., insurance reimbursement based upon DSM cat-
egories) which do the same. Foucault (1991) began using the
term "apparatus" to better reflect this concrete production of
the discourse in combination with the production of knowl-
edges. The descriptions that follow are descriptions of nexuses
of power within the respective discourses.
The Postmodern Discourse-Prominent
Intellectual Thought
In seeking to make a very broad statement of contrast
between modernist thought and postmodern thought, one can
point to the prominence given to human beings. Within mod-
ernist thought, a human being is simply one object/organism
among an infinite number of subjects to study. Knowledge is
something that is discovered. Within postmodern thought-
due to the prominence given to language-the human being
is given special prominence as the conduit/creator of all
knowledge.
To put it simply, the phenomenological theory of truth
views reality as the appearance of a phenomenon that we ex-
perience: this phenomenon is comprised both of an existence
and an essence. Briefly, existence refers to the form of the phe-
nomenon: qualities that define its structure. Essence refers to
existential nature of the phenomenon: qualities that speak to
its identity. While such a theory of truth can be traced all the
way back to Aristotle, Hegel (1807/1977) is credited for provid-
ing its most substantial elaboration in more recent times. One
key contribution that Hegel offers is that he substantively de-
scribes and demonstrates a systematic methodology for inves-
tigating and understanding phenomena: the dialectic method.
The dialectic is a method of investigation in which existential
105
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
qualities of a phenomenon are explored and hypotheses tested
via a logical process of contrasting opposites (Hegel's for-
mulation is briefly described as thesis-antithesis-synthesis).
Contrasting opposites (thesis-antithesis) is a means to expose
contradictions in the identity (i.e., existential nature) of the
phenomenon-a consciousness-raising process that prods one
to resolve the contradiction. This marks a major break with
the modem Discourse, which mainly relies upon the scientific
method as its systematic method for understanding reality.
Marx (Marx & Engels, 1845/1998; Marx & Engels,
1848/2008) would employ Hegel's dialectic method in his
own investigations concerning political economy. However,
by postulating that the essence of a phenomenon is manipu-
lated by material conditions rather than a reflection of the ideal
as Hegel proposed, Marx considerably altered Hegel's dialecti-
cal methodology. Marx's notion of a false consciousness shares
some affinity today with the postmodern project of conscious-
ness-raising. However, where both Marx and Hegel remain in
agreement-and what differentiates them from the postmod-
em formulation of phenomenology-is that they both posited
that the essence of a phenomenon is an inherent quality in
the phenomenon itself, as is the case with its existence. This
expression of phenomenology can be explained by its align-
ment with positivistic and naturalistic thought coalescing
out of the Enlightenment: elements of major foci within the
present modern Discourse. As Marx's choice of the term false
consciousness indicates, there is the stance that one true reality
still exists and that accurate perception is needed in order to
uncover it. This is further reflected in Humanist psychology's
project of seeking to understand one's true self.
When phenomenology is aligned with social construction-
ism and mimesis, one begins speaking about how reality and
identity are constructed and thus multiple realities are possi-
ble. The validity of the reality rests upon the level of verisimili-
tude it achieves (in relation to one's actual lived experiences)
within the dialogue of community.
This understanding of phenomenology promotes the stance
that accurate perception is required to understand the essence
of a phenomenon, and thus understand reality (as existence
and essence). And it is this view of phenomenology (aligned
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with positivism and naturalism) that informs Humanist psy-
chology of the twentieth century, such as Rogers (1951), in
which the goal of the therapeutic investigation is to under-
stand one's "true" self. Within philosophical circles, this un-
derstanding of phenomenology would continue to dominate
up to the work of Husserl (1913/1982). Husserl offered the
notion that the essence of a phenomenon does not lie within
the phenomenon itself (what he coined as the "natural stand-
point"), but rather, within the structure of consciousness of the
human being attempting to understand it. But it is his student,
Martin Heidegger, who would completely break phenomenol-
ogy from its alignment with positivism and naturalism.
Heidegger accomplishes this transformation of phenom-
enology by reducing the scope of phenomenology's project.
In his magnum opus Being in Time (1927/1962), Heidegger
does not seek to explain a basic phenomenological structure
for all objects in the universe; rather, he attempts to describe
the phenomenological structure for a human being (which he
labels "Da-sein"), exploring the essence of what it means to
be human. Building upon the insights of Husserl, Heidegger
(1927/1962) locates the essence of being human outside of
the phenomenon itself. But rather than locate it within con-
sciousness, Heidegger locates it within language, and hence,
culture. This transforms the phenomenological investigation
from one of accurate perception to one of accurate interpreta-
tion, making it a hermeneutical rather than scientific endeavor.
Heidegger attempts to describe the external nature of one's
essence of being human with the term "world" and the reality
of Da-sein as "being-in-the-world."
Gadamer (1960/1999) builds upon Heidegger's hermeneu-
tical move in two very important ways. First, through his elab-
oration of a "fusion of horizons" he outlines a dialectic method
based in relativism. While embracing the core purpose of the
dialectic method laid down by Hegel (and Socrates)-that of
exposing and thus making implicit contradictions explicit-
the hermeneutic and relativistic stance changes the final stage
of this process. Rather than the recognition of an antithesis
to one's thesis leading to a synthesis of the two, it leads to a
"fusion." This fusion is a dialogical event which opens one
up to many possibilities of essence, and hence reality. Such a
107
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
dialectical process is the foundation for the various schools of
critical theory (e.g., feminism, queer theory, critical race theory,
etc.). As will be described shortly, when aligned with the theo-
ries of social constructionism and mimesis, this entails a con-
sciousness-raising experience in which one actively seeks to
manipulate the essence that comprises one's "world."
The other concept that Gadamer expounds upon is that of
prejudice or bias. With the essence of a phenomenon existing
in language, this means that the very attempt by human beings
to understand a phenomenon is what grants it its essence. The
world that comprises one's being-in-the-world is made up of
biases. To Gadamer, bias has a neutral connotation; it is simply
a template for understanding phenomena, and thus, necessary
for human beings to interact in their environment. By granting
phenomena an essence, bias is not something that is separate
from reality: It is an essential part of reality. This becomes prob-
lematic when a particular bias serves to diminish one's being,
or undercut one's self worth. This is when a fusion of horizons
is sought-opening one up to other possibilities that are more
life enhancing.
To summarize, a phenomenological theory of truth as ex-
pressed within the postmodern discourse is as follows. Reality
is viewed as being comprised of an existence plus an essence.
This essence exists within language and is granted to phenom-
ena through human beings' attempts to understand it. Thus,
bias comprises reality as it informs one's understanding of it.
When a particular bias becomes problematic by diminishing
one's being, it can be questioned through use of the dialectic
method, a consciousness-raising experience that serves to open
one up to other possible essences that are more life enhanc-
ing. Furthermore, one's essence or "world" directly speaks to
one's identity. The prominence of identity in the postmodern
discourse will be elaborated upon further when discussing
the theory of mimesis. But first, an elaboration of social con-
structionism and its role in further fleshing out the notion of an
essence will be provided.
Social Constructionism-Theory of Epistemology
Social constructionism is a theory of relatively recent
origins, gaining much prominence with the work of Berger
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and Luckmann (1966). Gergen (1999) is a prolific author who
has done much to advance this theory in the field of sociology
and social welfare. Social constructionism takes the stance that
knowledge of reality occurs through understanding the forma-
tion of social constructs rather than a neutral observation of
natural laws at work in the universe. Coming into alignment
with phenomenology, it views reality as being comprised of
existence plus essence. Furthermore, it views the essence of a
phenomenon as being a product of language, which is granted
to a phenomenon when human beings attempt to understand
it. Hence, what is constructed is the essence of a phenome-
non, and as part of a greater whole (existence plus essence),
this consequently constructs the reality of a phenomenon.
Furthermore, it is noted that the existence of a phenomenon
has many attributes or qualities. The essence granted to a phe-
nomenon grants prominence to some attributes over others-
thus, in effect-shaping the existence of the phenomenon.
Conversely, the various attributes comprising the existence
of a phenomenon circumscribe what type of essence can be
granted to it-as the granting of an essence is a socially medi-
ated process in which agreement within a community must be
achieved.
Hence reality is viewed as a social construct, construct-
ed through a socially mediated process involving countless
human choices (Gergen, 1999). The idea that these choices exert
an influence on each other, and thus move towards forming
a self-reinforcing network or system is captured by the term
"discourse" (Foucault 1994a, 1994b). As the essence of a phe-
nomenon (and hence its overall reality) is seen as being con-
structed through this socially mediated process, and this so-
cially mediated process occurs within the scope of a particular
historical and cultural context, reality is seen as being situated
historically and culturally. In other words, while the existence
of a phenomenon may remain fairly constant across various
historical and cultural contexts, each unique context grants the
phenomenon a different essence-thus creating multiple reali-
ties for the same existence within a phenomenon. This leads
to the stance that there is no absolute reality (existence plus
essence) that transcends time and cultures (i.e. Reality). Hence,
the understanding of reality becomes a cultural and historical
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project: an examination of the social mediations that construct
the essences of a phenomenon.
This has huge implications when the phenomenon to be
examined is a human being-as is the case for social welfare
interventions. First, questions of essence relate directly to the
person's identity. Second, the relativism inherent in multiple
realities means that this essence is highly mutable. Third, as this
essence is socially mediated, it may arise that a person's own
voice is diminished in this mediation, and an essence/identity
constructed that undercuts one's self-worth (e.g., being overly
identified by one's diagnostic label). This, in turn, undercuts a
person's perceived self-efficacy, and thus limits possibilities to
bring about change to a problem area of one's existence (e.g., a
problem in functioning).
Rather than intervene solely at the existence of a problem
area, postmodern practices attend primarily to its essence
within a person. This has led to critiques that these approach-
es ignore the problem, yet these critiques only have validity
if one views reality as being solely comprised of existence.
Being highly mutable, the constructed essence is highly open
to change. This involves an examination and questioning of
the social mediated process that produced the oppressive con-
structs and the recognition that other possible realities exist: in
short, this is a consciousness-raising exercise. Once these alter-
native constructions are recognized, ones are selected by the
client that hold most true for him/her and serve to enhance
her/his self worth. Next, a community of individuals is sought
that will serve to support this newly selected construction. This
change towards a more empowering essence/identity of the
person in relation to the problem area leads the person to act in
a more efficacious manner in regards to issues of functioning,
thus directly affecting the existence of the problem by either
diminishing it or eliminating it. The dynamics of this process
will be elaborated further in the following section on mimesis,
which is reflective of social constructionism and phenomenol-
ogy coming into alignment with notions of narrative.
Mimesis-A Theory of Causality
Paul Ricoeur (1984-1988), in his mammoth three volume
work Time and Narrative, attempts to advance the project
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begun by Heidegger (1962/1927) in Being and Time: exploring
the essence of being human. He does this by demonstrating
how the construction of one's essence/identity occurs within a
narrative framework via its relationship to time. The existence
of one's identity is represented by one's lived experiences
(within mimesis, one is defined by one's actions). These past
experiences (which exist as events in one's life) circumscribe
the boundaries concerning who one is (i.e., reality/being as
existence plus essence). Yet when reflecting upon or commu-
nicating to others one's existence (e.g., how one's day went; a
problem in functioning) one does not give a second-by-second
account of one's actions. Ricoeur (1984-1988) refers to this con-
ception of time as progressing via discrete units as measured
by a clock as "cosmic time." Rather, one selectively chooses
from the multitude of past experiences deemed most perti-
nent-constructing a narrative whose theme (essence) ad-
equately captures the reality of the situation (and hence the
person) being described. Ricoeur describes this selective ar-
rangement of events as "human time."
Usually, how one selectively chooses these lived experi-
ences is a result of one's prejudice/bias and occurs on an intui-
tive level. Ricoeur describes this process as prefiguration. This
same dynamic occurs when encountering phenomena (e.g., a
stop sign) in one's everyday life that one seeks to understand
and interact with. If one had to consciously direct the con-
struction process for every phenomenon that one encountered
during the day, one would not be able to function. Hence, bias
plays an important role in understanding the phenomena we
encounter. It also serves to direct our actions.
Ricoeur's (1984-1988) elaboration of mimesis is a postmod-
ern update of the concept of mimesis offered by Aristotle (335
B.C./1996). Ricoeur's update involves breaking up mimesis
into three parts. Full treatment of this formulation has been
provided elsewhere (Dybicz, 2010). Briefly, this formulation
is as follows: I have an image of who I am (based upon my
lived experiences) and an image of who I would like to be. The
image of who I would like to be guides my present actions. The
image of who I am is circumscribed by my lived experiences
(i.e., I am defined by my actions). Some important implications
arise from this premise.
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First, keeping in alignment with the postmodern project's
focus on human beings (and how they understand living),
the scope of this theory of causality only encompasses human
action (as opposed to the modernist Discourse, whose theory
of causality seeks to encompass all objects in the universe).
Second, mimesis promotes a causality that is future-oriented
(who I would like to be); this notion of causality is reflected in
the importance given to understanding a client's dreams and
goals when employing a postmodern practice approach (De-
Shazer & Berg, 1992; Saleebey, 2006). Third, movement toward
an image of who I would like to be is an expression of free will;
consequently, free-will is an integral component in the "equa-
tion" explaining the causes of human behavior.
As mentioned above, narrative/social constructions-
which serve to define who one is-usually occur on the intui-
tive level (via one's bias). These constructions give prominence
to some qualities of one's existence over others. This, in turn,
defines the horizon of who one can be. Now it may occur that
a socially mediated construction/narrative is oppressive to a
person in that it undercuts one's self worth by giving promi-
nence to qualities with negative valuations (in the social work
helping situation, this usually occurs when concerns about
dysfunction are given the most prominence). If the person
does not question these constructs, then the person's horizon
of who one can become is impoverished and limited.
Thus postmodern practices aim their efforts at assisting the
client in questioning these narrative constructions: hence, they
represent endeavors at consciousness-raising. While a diagno-
sis may describe particular qualities of existence of a person,
the postmodern emphasis is that a person is so much more
than this. Opening up the client's awareness to these other
qualities of his/her existence becomes the task at hand. Once
a client's consciousness has been raised to this level of aware-
ness, the client can then take greater control of the construction
process by engaging in a consciously directed effort at select-
ing one's lived experiences regarding the issue of concern. This
is what Ricoeur (1984-1988) describes as configuration. Past
experiences (i.e., expressions of free will) are sought that con-
tradict the theme of negative valuations offered by the old nar-
rative construct, and instead, offer a theme promoting positive
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valuations (e.g., strengths). This opens new horizons regard-
ing how one can be in relation to the issue of concern. This
new narrative construction is often referred to as a counter-
story (Brubaker & Wright, 2006; Dingus, 2006; Nelson, 1995).
Seeking to validate this new essence defining oneself (who I
want to be), one begins to act accordingly. One seeks to make
sure that problems in functioning do not interfere with or di-
minish the expressions of these positive valuations or strengths
in one's actions. In such a manner, these problems in function-
ing are either eliminated or diminished.
Last, Ricoeur elaborates refiguration as the process of
acting as an audience member to these narrative constructions.
Capturing the socially-mediated nature of the construction
process, refiguration reflects the process that not only oneself,
but also other members of one's community, examines this
new narrative construction to decide if it does, in fact, achieve
a level of verisimilitude ("truth" with a small "t"). Occurring
concurrently with building the counterstory, it becomes ex-
tremely important to advance the goal of finding a community
of persons (i.e., those offering caring relationships) that can
legitimate the new construction (i.e., counterstory), and thus,
establish its verisimilitude.
The Role of Science within Postmodern Practice
As described above, postmodern practice interventions
are endeavors at consciousness-raising. Concerns about iden-
tity are prominent, as reflections upon one's identity form the
central tenet in explaining human action (mimesis). Identity
is seen as arising from narrative constructions; this involves a
process of selectively choosing from one's lived experiences.
As these past experiences can be configured in a multitude of
different ways, there are a multitude of possibilities, or facets,
to one's identity-what Bakhtin (1921/1993, 1929/1984) de-
scribes as "multiple voices." The existence plus essence com-
prising one's identity form a reciprocal relationship. One's
existence (i.e., lived experiences displaying qualities) circum-
scribes the boundaries as to the possible essences (i.e., themes
speaking to one's qualities) that may arise in a construction.
The essence that does arise from a construction gives promi-
nence and value to some qualities over others.
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Thus this consciousness-raising endeavor involves the fol-
lowing steps. Problem-saturated (and hence oppressive) narra-
tive constructions are questioned: their dominance as the only
possible construction of reality is questioned. As recognition
is gained that other constructions are possible, these possibili-
ties are explored, giving attention to those constructions that
advance positive valuations, and thus, advance themes reflec-
tive of the client's preferred identity. This step involves moving
away from the usual intuitive application of bias (i.e., the se-
lecting of lived experiences) to one that is more consciously di-
rected. When a theme(s) (i.e., essence) is identified that reflects
a client's preferred identity, past experiences are selected that
support this theme(s). Consequently, the client's future actions
are directed towards creating additional lived experiences that
support this theme(s), as a means to establish the verisimili-
tude of the new construction (counterstory). Finally, the client
is linked with caring individuals who serve to validate this
new construction, thus establishing its verisimilitude within
a community.
Now, to elaborate a role for science and scientific knowledge
(as presently defined within the modem Discourse), one must
describe how it aids this consciousness-raising process. Well,
the one thing that science prides itself at being extraordinarily
good at doing (for it is embraced as its main project) is that
of describing the qualities of existence of an object, and how
this object interacts with other objects, affecting their qualities
of existence. Within the field of social welfare, these descrip-
tions are predominantly focused upon the healthy functioning
of the individual in society. As stated above, the qualities of
existence of a phenomenon form the building blocks (via lived
experiences) from which possible themes (essences) may arise
for a social/narrative construction.
Individuals access social welfare services as a result of a
problem, issue, or crisis in their lived experiences. Science is
able to provide a detailed description of the qualities of this
problem and how it impacts qualities of functioning in other
areas of a client's lived experiences. This description serves
as a "map" that circumscribes the boundaries within which a
possible theme may arise. The theme that arises from such a
description is problem-saturated (naturally so, as the project is
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to provide a detailed description of the problem). To contrib-
ute to the consciousness-raising process, this problem-saturat-
ed theme is used as the thesis from which to begin a dialectical
inquiry. Past experiences are then sought that contradict the
theme laid out in the thesis. This leads to a dialogical process in
which a multitude of possible constructions are revealed-and
a fusion of horizons occurs when the client selects a construc-
tion that serves to advance his/her preferred identity.
White and Epston (1990) offer an excellent illustration of
this process when employing the technique of externalizing
the problem as a means towards consciousness-raising. The
first step involves "mapping the influence of the problem" (pp.
42-44). This is when scientific knowledge is used to describe
the problem. For example, in his case study of Nick, a six-
year-old suffering from encopresis (soiling his pants), White
uses principles of systems theory to describe how Nick's bio-
psycho-social functioning has been impacted at home and at
school, and how his parents' functioning has been impacted
as well. But rather than using this information to formulate
a diagnosis and direct treatment, he uses it as a thesis upon
which to proceed to the second step, "mapping the influence
of persons" (pp. 45-48). In this step, he asks clients to relate
expressions of free will (via past experiences) that contradict
the theme of the problem's influence on one's actions. From
these reflections, lived experiences are chosen that advance a
new theme, and hence new construction; for Nick, the quality
of being a good boy was changed from "one who does not soil
his pants" to that of "one who valiantly struggles against his
externalized antagonist, 'sneaky poo,' by attempting to resist
its influence." Consequently, Nick began to direct his actions
to support the theme arising from this new construction. Also,
at this stage (and if appropriate), scientific knowledge arising
from the diagnosis of the problem can be offered to the client
as information and advice to help advance him/her in secur-
ing this new identity. Information and advice represents a form
of care (Brubaker & Wright, 2006) that contributes towards
achieving verisimilitude of the new construction.
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The Modem Discourse
Inquiry in the modem Discourse does not give special
prominence to the human being. In its effort to understand
all objects in the universe, scientific inquiry views a person
as simply one possible object/organism to study out of a in-
finite multitude. The same methodology is used for all. Due
to space limitations and the fact that the following intellectual
thought is predominantly well understood, brief descriptions
are given.
Correspondence Theory of Truth-Theory of Ontology
This theory views the world, and hence reality, as compris-
ing only existence: the human mind plays no role in the make-
up of reality-it is merely a tool used to observe it. Statements
about objects describe qualities of this existence and thus are
seen as true (i.e., facts) when they are demonstrated (through
mutually confirmed observation) to accurately "correspond"
to reality.
Positivism-Theory of Epistemology
Aligning with the correspondence theory of truth, posi-
tivism emphasizes the role played by accurate observation as
the means to understand reality. Truth is founded upon the
combination of accurate sense experience (hence its embrace
of empiricism) and positive verification (hence its embrace of
the scientific method). The ideal condition for achieving this is
to acquire a value-free stance. Consequently, the role played
by "bias" is fundamentally different from that of social con-
structionism. Within social constructionism, bias is a core com-
ponent in the construction of reality. Within positivism, bias
is separate from reality; it's simply a creation of the human
mind. Bias is something that interferes with achieving an ac-
curate sense experience-hence, the goal is to eliminate it as
much as possible.
Newton's Third Law of Rational Mechanics
(Action-Reaction)-Theory of Causality
This is a theory of causality that seeks to explain the motion
of all objects in the universe. An update from a definition first
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proposed by Aristotle, Newton's description of a cause pro-
ducing an effect (a change is the quality/qualities of existence
of an object) is seen as applying universally to all things. This
is why physics is often held up as the model for capturing
reality. Newton's view of causality as the movement of one
object/variable impacting another object/variable to produce
an effect, coming into alignment with a correspondence theory
of truth and positivism, forms a mutually reinforcing network
that fundamentally defines the modern discourse.
The Role of Social Construction
within the Modernist Discourse
How the modern Discourse was able to define a role for
moral knowledge (the prominent knowledge from the preced-
ing discourse) as a means to circumscribe the boundaries for
conducting an investigation has been described earlier. Thus,
the role defined for postmodern insights-particularly social
constructions-(the prominent knowledge from a challeng-
ing discourse) must be different. Social constructions speak
towards the operation of bias. Since the elimination of bias is
a major goal in understanding reality, social constructions are
eminently useful in identifying this bias. As statements of reality
are communicated through language, and social constructions
arise through the use of language, the difficulty in removing
this bias is further revealed by understanding the social con-
struction process. From the standpoint of conducting social
welfare research, this stance may be described as "diminished
positivism" (R. Leighninger, personal communication, March
25, 2010)-an acknowledgement that bias is much harder to
remove than originally thought. Thus, insights from postmod-
ernism are used as a tool to aid in one's investigation.
The upsurge since the 1970s in the recognition and im-
portance of culture as a variable within the helping situation
further reflects this stance. During this period (1970s-present)
greater and greater importance has been given in the litera-
ture to achieving what first was described as cultural sensitiv-
ity, and more recently is termed cultural competency. While
not determining reality itself, the social constructions (within
the modem discourse) arising from culture become legitimate
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variables, which in turn, affect how individuals interact with
reality. This stance is illustrated by those who seek to advocate
evidence-based practice, yet seek to have this same practice be
culturally competent as well (Bates, 2006).
Accommodation of Knowledges between Discourses
By its very definition, a discourse is a particular align-
ment of knowledges and practices that mutually reinforce
and signify each other. This makes it difficult for any true ac-
commodation to take place between competing discourses.
Knowledges from a competing discourse are not ignored, but
they are subjugated. They take on a different expression when
placed in a different alignment (i.e., discourse). A brief histori-
cal overview concerning the clash of discourses illustrates this
dynamic.
The predominantly moral social welfare Discourse of the
19t century, when faced with the emergence of the modern,
scientific discourse of the late 1800s, did not seek to ignore
science-as the Scientific Charity movement (Trattner 1999;
Zimbalist, 1977) and the Settlement House surveys (Trattner
1999; Zimbalist, 1977) attest. Yet within this predominantly
moral Discourse, "science" was expressed much differently
than it would be in the modern Discourse. Based upon a ju-
risprudence approach to investigation seeking to understand
how the human soul-and its alignment with "natural laws"-
explained human behavior, "science" became a tool to aid in
this investigation. Science achieved expression as an organized
form of data collection to support jurisprudence-based expla-
nations (Zimbalist, 1977). Looking back at these efforts from
within the modern Discourse, they are seen as highly limited
and shallow expressions of science, lacking many key insights
(such as the need for hypothesis testing). Hence, they are not
viewed as being truly scientific (Zimbalist, 1977).
The modern scientific Discourse gained dominance in
social welfare by the 1920s. It did not abandon moral knowl-
edge, as described earlier, instead employing it to circumscribe
the boundaries of its investigation. Yet, someone from the
19' century would argue that this assigned an overly limited
role to moral knowledge-as within this framework moral
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knowledge does not speak towards explaining how the
human soul drives human action. In present times, the modem
Discourse faces a challenge from the postmodern discourse.
People operating within the modem Discourse have sought
to incorporate postmodern insights concerning language
and bias by using them as a tool to aid in one's investigation.
Similar to the scenario of "science" within the moral Discourse,
a postmodernist would argue that this is a limited and shallow
expression of what bias/social constructions could be (by
denying that bias actually comprises reality).
To date, postmodernists have not been very eloquent in
elaborating a role for science. While stating that they do not
seek to completely ignore scientific knowledge, energies have
mostly been devoted to critiquing shortcomings of the mod-
ernist approach. Being in a subordinate position, this is a nec-
essary step in trying to legitimize this competing position.
However, current literature suggests, as was illustrated by
the example of White and Epston (1990) above, that scientific
knowledge is used as a means to circumscribe the boundar-
ies of one's investigation. Yet, a modernist will view this as an
overly limiting role for scientific knowledge-as it is not used
to explain human action via the workings of natural laws.
Conclusion
The postmodem discourse, with its unique alignment of
knowledges and practices, creates a new "game" for social
work interventions: an endeavor at consciousness-raising.
Successful consciousness-raising is what produces change.
Within this new game, tag phrases such as "the client is the
expert" and the social worker/client relationship being one of
"editor/author" gain meaning and make sense. This paper has
addressed the question of what role scientific knowledge and
investigation has to play within an endeavor at consciousness-
raising. Looking to the past for a historical comparison has
helped direct where to look to find an answer to this question.
As the Tuskeegee study (Jones, 1981) illustrates, an overly
naive application of the dominant Discourse's method of in-
vestigation can lead to morally reprehensible acts that do
considerable harm to participants. This should serve as a
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cautionary tale against a similar "anything goes" approach by
practitioners using the dialectic method of postmodernism:
scientific knowledge has a vital role to play in circumscribing
the boundaries within which the dialectic method-aimed at
consciousness-raising-is employed.
Within the modern discourse, a universal code of ethics
arose to circumscribe boundaries of practice and investigation.
This was appropriate, as the modern discourse emphasizes a
universal reality. The postmodern discourse emphasizes par-
ticularity in the form of multiple realities. Consequently, a
continuous addition to the scientific knowledge base-the ac-
quiring of knowledge for a multitude of contexts-is what is
necessary to circumscribe boundaries. Thus postmodern social
work practice calls for the continued production of scientific
knowledge to meet the demands of ever-changing contexts.
This role for scientific knowledge may seem shallow or inad-
equate to a modernist, yet as has been illustrated, such accom-
modation is the natural result of competing discourses.
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